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ABSTRACT
Smartphones have become ubiquitous and smartphone users are increasingly
relying on the mobile applications (app for short) to store and handle private
information. The fluidity of mobile apps and mobile app markets has com-
plicated mobile app security. Many new threats emerged are either because
of the deficiency of mobile app development or the design ambiguities of the
Android operating system.
In order to seek a better understanding of mobile app security, we present
a systematic study on security threats to Android apps in two dimensions.
First, we study Android apps from mobile health (mHealth for short) sector,
in order to understand the prevalence of mobile app threats to that sector. In
particular, we present a three-stage study of the mHealth apps to show that
mHealth apps make widespread use of unsecured Internet communications
and third party servers. Assuming that mobile apps are well protected by
their developers, we ask a second question: are there any limitations in
fundamental Android security design that can be used by malicious parties
to disclose users’ sensitive information? We study a newly discovered threat,
side-channel information leaks on Android devices, in detail. Particularly, we
discover an unexpected channel of information leaks from per-app data-usage
statistics and demonstrate that a malicious app can infer users’ identity or
investment information with zero-permission by monitoring the channel. To
mitigate these threats, we propose defense strategies for both widespread
threats on mHealth apps and the side-channel information leaks on Android
devices.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
With the growing popularity of Android operating system, an enormous num-
ber of Android apps has been developed in recent years. As smartphones are
becoming a ubiquitous source of private and sensitive personal information,
the quality of the booming apps can be a concern. Poorly programmed An-
droid apps may contain information leakage that undermines mobile users’
privacy and security. In this chapter, section 1.1 gives an overview of the
phenomenal trend of Android mobile system. Along with this trend, secu-
rity concerns are also expressed and their relevant research studies regarding
Android app security are listed in section 1.1. Section 1.2 refines the initial
motivation and focuses our research questions on specific components in An-
droid app security. Section 1.3 presents the approach to address the problem
in two different directions as elaborated in sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2. The main
contributions of this master thesis are summarized in section 1.4. Section 1.5
gives the organization of this master thesis.
1.1 Overview
Today’s smartphones have as much computing resources and power as a high
end computer only a few years ago and smartphones are becoming more and
more popular these years. Current mobile operating system, such as Android,
has gained tremendous popularity these years, with 81.4% market share in
the mobile operating system market share [2] and more than one billion device
activations [3]. Android allows users to run various apps developed by many
independent developers downloaded from app markets, and more than one
million apps are available on official Android app market, Google Play [4].
Unlike most of the PC apps, Android apps collect, process and store personal
sensitive information, which may undermine users’ security and privacy.
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Indeed, in recent years, we have seen waves of Android-based malware
[5, 6] that exploit different vulnerabilities within this new computing plat-
form, highlighting the security and privacy threats it is facing. Furthermore,
Android’s security protection has been under scrutiny for years. A few weak-
nesses of the system, such as permission re-delegation [7] and capability leaks
[8], are revealed by researchers. Particularly, a recent blog [9] from Leviathan
Security Group describes the malicious activities that could be performed by
an app without any permissions, including reading from SD card, accessing a
list of installed apps, getting some device and system information (GSM and
SIM vendor ID, the Android ID and kernel version) and pinging through a
Linux Shell. Most of the problems reported here are either implementation
weaknesses or design ambiguities that lead developers to inadvertent expo-
sures. Examples include SD card read and unauthorized ping, which have
all been fixed. The rest turns out to be less of a concern, as they are al-
most impossible to exploit in practice (GSM/SIM/Android ID, which leads
to nothing more than mobile country code and mobile network code).
1.2 Problem Statement
Compared with the phenomenal progress in Android operating system and
the apps on its platform, the ways Android devices are being used today
are even more stunning. Increasingly, Android smartphones become primary
devices not only for traditional phone calling, but for email checking, mes-
saging, mapping/navigation, entertainment, social networking and even for
activities as important as healthcare and investment management. The vast
array of Android apps enables mobile users to store sensitive private infor-
mation on their smartphones. As a large amount of new Android apps are
constantly submitted to app markets and become instantly available to users,
we believe Android device has become an increasingly attractive target for
security attacks, which calls for several specific questions:
1. What are the most widespread and serious security concerns existing
among Android apps?
2. Are the original security designs of smartphone systems, like Android,
ready for those highly diverse, fast-evolving apps?
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3. Given the findings of limitations in Android security design, what kind
of vulnerabilities can be explored by malicious parties if they want to
pilfer users’ secrets?
4. How is it possible to protect mobile phone users against security threats
such as information leakage on the Android apps?
1.3 Our Approach
To answer the first question, we will choose a specific sector of Android apps,
for example, mHealth, which usually contains highly sensitive information.
By studying the Android apps in mHealth sector, we try to answer what
the most widespread security concerns are and the approach is illustrated
in section 1.3.1. After understanding what the widespread threats are, we
are further asking if any loopholes exist in fundamental security designs of
Android. If so, we want to further explore the possibility to pilfer users’
sensitive information with the finding of the security loopholes. We illustrate
the approach to address the second and third questions in section 1.3.2.
A fourth question naturally comes into our mind after exploring enough
security threats on Android apps: how can we mitigate these threats? Two
different mitigation techniques are to be proposed for the purpose of the
above two distinct directions: one is for general security threats on Android,
and another one is for a specific threat based on the finding of security
loopholes on Android.
1.3.1 Study on Security Threats in mHealth
Advanced techniques based on mobile computing and communications tech-
nology significantly improve health care quality and efficiency. Mobile devices
greatly enable individuals and their hospital staffs to better monitor their
health and deliver health care services. However, implementing these mo-
bile health (mHealth) technologies brings up certain privacy concerns about
users’ sensitive health care data. The proliferation of mHealth applications
results in greater chance that applications are not being carefully examined
in terms of privacy protection.
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In our study, we choose mHealth sector as our study target, since new se-
curity and privacy risks particular to mobile computing and communications
technology abound in mHealth apps [10, 11] and the data from mHealth
apps is particularly private and sensitive to mobile users. Furthermore, the
aspects of mHealth make it different from other health information systems:
First, mHealth apps allow a much larger amount of data being collected from
the patient, as mobile devices can collect data over extended periods of time.
Second, a much broader range of health-related data is being collected, as
many mHealth apps collect patient activities and lifestyle, not only phys-
iological data, but also include physical activity, location tracking, eating
habits and diet details, social interactions and so on. Third, the nature of
communications technology and mobile computing exposes many new attack
surfaces to the outside world.
To answer what the most widespread and serious security concerns are
among Android mHealth apps, we conduct our study with a narrow-down
methodology: firstly, we prepare a list of attack surfaces by researching liter-
ature and observing a large dataset of randomly sampled apps; second, from
the above list, we study each one attack surface and find whether indeed the
threat exists extensively in a small dataset; lastly, after locating the threats
that are widespread in Android mHealth apps, we further explore how se-
rious the threats can be by surveying a small dataset of randomly sampled
apps. The study on security concerns of Android mHealth apps is elaborated
in chapter 3.
1.3.2 Study Side Channel Threats against Android Apps
Actually, the design of Android takes security seriously. It is built upon a
sandbox and permission model, in which each app is isolated from others by
Linux user-based protection and required to explicitly ask for permissions
to access the resources outside its sandbox before it can be installed on a
phone. Compared with what security models are provided by conventional
desktop-oriented OSes, even Linux on which Android is built, this security
design looks pretty solid.
In our research, we are asking a different question: assuming that Android’s
security design has been faithfully implemented and apps are well protected by
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their developers, what can a malicious app still learn about the user’s private
information without any permission at all? For such a zero-permission app,
all it can access are a set of seemingly harmless resources shared across users
(i.e., apps), which are made publicly available by Android and its underlying
Linux, for the purpose of facilitating coordination among apps and simplify-
ing access control. However, the rapidly-evolving designs and functionalities
of emerging apps, particularly their rich and diverse background informa-
tion (e.g. social network, public online services, etc.), begin to invalidate
such design assumptions, turning thought-to-be innocuous data into serious
information leaks.
In chapter 4, we explore the possibility of Android turning public resources
into sources of side-channel information leaks. For example, network data
usage of an app is deliberately published by Android through its Linux public
directory, aiming to help a smartphone user keep track of the app’s mobile
data consumption. In our research, we try to prove that this piece of ap-
parently harmless and also useful data can actually be used to fingerprint a
user’s certain online activity, such as tweeting. This knowledge, combined
with the background information that comes with the Twitter app (i.e., pub-
lic tweets), can be used to infer the user’s true identity, using an inference
technique we developed as described in section 4.2 and 4.3. As another ex-
ample, a user’s investment interests can be inferred by fingerprinting the
network usage statistics as described in section 4.4.
1.4 Main Contributions
Some of the major contributions are as follows:
• Understanding major security issues in Android mHealth apps. Through
our multi-stage study, it shows some serious problems with the Android
mHealth apps. The major issue is unencrypted communication over the
Internet and the use of third party hosting and storage services. Our
study shows that a significant number of mHealth apps from Google
Play market have these issues. Many Android app developers are not
security experts and using encrypted communication is more expensive
than using unencrypted communication. Third party cloud and hosting
services provide a very economical solution but have serious implica-
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tions to host the app’s services and store users’ sensitive data. We
believe that these issues need immediate attentions from both vendors
and users.
• Understanding of information leaks from Android public resources. Dif-
ferent from prior research that mainly focuses on implementation flaws
within Android, our study contributes to a better understanding of
an understudied yet fundamental weakness in Android design: the in-
formation leaks from the resources that are not originally considered
to be confidential and therefore made available for improving system
usability. This has been achieved through a suite of new inference tech-
niques designed to demonstrate that highly-sensitive user data can be
recovered from the public resources, in the presence of rich background
information provided by popular apps and online resources.
• First step toward mitigating information leaks from Android public re-
sources. We have designed a new mitigation approach, aiming to pre-
serve the utility of such public data to the legitimate parties while
controlling the way that an adversary can use it to derive user secrets.
• Proposing strategies for security concerns of mHealth apps. To auto-
matically detect data leaks in Android mHealth apps, we have proposed
a static analysis framework for mHealth apps to detect any possible
links between private data and leakage sinks. We also present general
compliance recommendations for mHealth app vendors to minimize se-
curity risks to mHealth users.
1.5 Outline
Chapter 2 gives thorough background information on the mHealth technol-
ogy, Android operating system and its security mechanisms. Section 2.1 ex-
plains various important concepts in the Android operating system such as
four components, inter-component communication, and permissions. Section
2.2 explains Android security mechanisms.
Chapter 3 aims to understand the security threats to Android apps in a
specific sector, mHealth. Section 3.1 introduces the related work. Section
6
3.2 explains the methods to build datasets for the three stages of the study
respectively. Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 highlight the results for the three-stage
study. Section 3.3 provides a classification of Android mHealth apps and
forms a list of attack surfaces that need attention. Section 3.4 investigates the
list of attack surfaces and forms a subset of the attack surfaces are the most
widespread. Then section 3.5 study the problems that are the most serious
in section 3.4 and concludes that Android mHealth apps make widespread
use of unsecured Internet and third party servers.
Chapter 4 introduces a newly-discovered side channel attack on Android,
which uses per-app data-usage statistics to cause information leaks. Section
4.1 illustrates the related work. Section 4.2 describes the techniques we
use to infer private information from public resources on Android with zero
permission. Section 4.3 and section 4.4 highlight two attack instances using
the techniques described in section 4.2. Section 4.3 demonstrates an instance
of inferring a mobile user’s identity with combined usage of Twitter app data-
usage statistics and publicly accessible Twitter API. Section 4.4 introduces
an example of knowing a mobile user’s investment interests by monitoring
the data-usage statistics of Yahoo! Finance.
Chapter 5 discusses mitigation strategies for the security risks introduced
in chapter 3 and 4. Section 5.1 introduces strategies and enforcement frame-
work on Android to mitigate the side channel inference from public resources
on Android. The methods introduced are round up or round down and aggre-
gation of data usage statistics on Android. Section 5.2 proposes a static anal-
ysis framework to mitigate general information leaks from Android mHealth
apps and provides compliance recommendations for the threats that are the
most widespread and serious as concluded in chapter 3.
Chapter 6 discusses the summary of findings of this master thesis in section
6.1 and the limitations for our study in section 6.2.
Chapter 7 concludes the entire master thesis with the highlights of our
work and potential future scope of this work.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
This chapter gives background information of the Android operating system
and its security mechanisms. Section 2.1 explains the fundamentals of the
Android operating system. Section 2.2 introduces Android security mecha-
nisms.
2.1 Android Operating System
Android is an operating system based on Linux for mobile devices. It provides
a rich application framework to allow developers to build apps written in
Java. The Android operating system is a multi-user system, in which each
app has a unique user ID (UID). All files in an app will be assigned to that
apps UID and normally not accessible to other apps. Every app runs in its
own Linux process on a separate Dalvik Virtual Machine isolated from other
apps, so that apps must explicitly share data and resources. In this way,
Android implements the principle of least privilege. That is, no application,
by default, will have the permission to perform operations to adversely impact
the system, other applications, or the user.
App components are the essential building blocks of an Android app. There
are four different types of components, of which each serves a distinct pur-
pose.
• An Activity component is a single screen with user interface, which can
interact with the user via touchscreen or physical keyboard. An app
commonly contains multiple Activities, one for each screen presented
to the user. The Activities work together to form a cohesive user expe-
rience, and each one is independent of the others. A different app can
start any one of these Activities (if it is allowed), possibly expecting a
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return value. Only one Activity at a time on the screen has input and
processing focus.
• A Service component provides background long-running operations or
performs work for remote processes that continues even after its appli-
cation loses focus. A Service does not provide a user interface. Another
component, such as an Activity, can start a Service or interact with it.
In order to interact with other component, Services define arbitrary
interfaces for Remote Procedure Call (RPC), including method execu-
tion and callbacks, which can only be called if the Service has been
bound.
• A Content Provider component manages a shared set of app data. The
app data could be either private to the app itself or shared with other
apps, if they have the proper permissions. You can store the data in
many different places: in the file system, a SQLite database, on the
web, or any other persistent storage location. The Content Provider
supports the basic CRUD (create, retrieve, update, and delete) func-
tions, through which components in other apps can retrieve or modify
the data according to the Content Providers schema. The data in a
Content Provider is addressed via a content URI.
• A Broadcast Receiver component is asynchronous event mailbox that
responds to system-wide broadcast announcements represented by ac-
tion strings. Android defines many standard action string correspond-
ing to system events for example, the screen has turned off, the battery
is low, or the system has booted. Developers can define their own ac-
tion strings for example, to let other apps know that some data has
been downloaded is available for them to use.
Android uses Intent for inter-component communication in many ways:
to start an Activity, to start a Service, or to deliver a Broadcast message.
There are two types of Intents: explicit intent and implicit intent. Explicit
intents specify the component to start by name, whereas implicit intents
do not name a specific component, but instead declare a general operation
to perform. An intent filter is an expression of action strings, in order to
specify what type of intents the component would like to receive. Android
provides a permission mechanism to enforce restrictions of inter-component
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communication and access to system resources. Per-URI permissions can be
granted to specify ad hoc accesses to specific pieces of data. Permissions
are requested per application at its installation time. Once installed, this
security policy cannot change.
Each application includes a manifest file. The manifest file describes the
component of the app, including their types and intent filters. Note that
Broadcast Receiver can be dynamically created in runtime, in addition to
being statically defined in the manifest file. The manifest file declares which
permissions the app must have in order to access protected parts of the API
and interact with other apps.
2.2 Android Security
2.2.1 Android Security Mechanisms
Android is designed and built based on the Linux and it seeks to provide
additional security controls over: user data protection, system resources pro-
tection (including the network) and application isolation. To provide these
additional security controls, Android supports these key extra security fea-
tures:
Security at the OS level through the Linux kernel. As described in
section 2.1, Android is based on Linux and the Linux kernel provides several
key security features to Android, including a user-based permission model,
process isolation and secure IPC and so on.
Secure inter-process communication. Processes are able to commu-
nicate using any of the standard UNIX-style mechanisms. Android also
provides new inter-process communication (IPC for short) mechanisms, in-
cluding Binder, sssServices, Intents and Content Providers. Binder is a
lightweight remote procedure call mechanism designed for high-performance
in-process and cross-process calls. Services can provide interfaces directly ac-
cessible using Binder. The concepts of Intents and Content Providers have
been discussed in section 2.1.
Android permission model. By default, an Android app can only ac-
cess a limited range of system resources. The access to sensitive resources is
protected via a security mechanisms known as Permissions. It provides pro-
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tected APIs for the sensitive resources, including camera, location, Bluetooth,
telephony, SMS/MMS and network. To make use of the protected APIs, an
app must declare APIs’ associated permissions in a manifest file and the per-
missions are agreed upon at installation time by users. Once granted, the
permissions are applied to the app as long as it’s installed.
Application sandbox. All applications on Android run in an application
sandbox. As described in section 2.1, the Android assigns UID to each An-
droid app and runs it as an individual user in a separate process. The kernel
enforces security between applications through standard Linux facilities, such
as UID-based permissions and process isolation. The application sandbox is
implemented in the kernel, this security model extends to native code and
operating system apps. Since all Android applications are sandboxed at the
OS level, memory corruption is not an issue in Android.
Application signing. Application signing allows developers to identify
the author of the application and enables updating applications without using
complicated interfaces and permissions. Application signing is the first step
to ensure the application sandbox mechanism. It signs certificates to ensure
which UID is associated with which app and different apps run under different
UIDs. When an app is installed on an Android device, the system verifies
that the app has been properly certified.
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CHAPTER 3
PREVALENCE OF SECURITY CONCERNS
IN ANDROID MHEALTH APPS
In this chapter, we aim to provide a deeper understanding of the security
threats to Android apps by studying apps from a specific sector, mHealth.
Section 3.1 illustrates the related work of mHealth technology and its secu-
rity and privacy issues. Section 3.2 explains the main methods to conduct a
systematic study on the security threats to Android mHealth apps. Specif-
ically, it elaborates the methods of how we collect apps as our dataset for
the three-stage study. Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 elaborate the findings for
the three-stage study. Section 3.3 formulates a list of attack surfaces that
need attention in mHealth apps. Section 3.5 focuses on the attack surfaces
that are proven by section 3.4 for having significant issues in most of the
apps. By analyzing a new randomly selected dataset, section 3.5 shows that
mHealth apps make widespread use of unsecured Internet communications
and third party servers, suggesting that increased use of mHealth apps could
lead to less secure treatment of health data unless mHealth vendors make
improvements in the way they communication and store data.
3.1 Related Work
3.1.1 mHealth Technology
Advanced techniques based on mobile computing and communications tech-
nology significantly improve health care quality, improve efficiency and re-
duce costs. Mobile health (mHealth) apps and medical devices greatly enable
individuals to better monitor and manage their health conditions. Mobile
apps for clinicians improve the way in which hospital professions interact
with their patients and deliver health care services.
The mHealth trend is evident: as of March 2013, Research2Guidance re-
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ported that there were about 97,000 mHealth apps across 62 app stores [12].
According to a report from MarketsandMarkets, the global mHealth market
is predicted to grow from $6.21 billion in revenue in 2013 to $23.49 billion by
2018 at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR for short) of 30.5 percent
over the five-year-period from 2013 to 2018. The mobile fitness and well-
ness market is expected to grow at a CAGR of 36.7 percent from 2013 to
2018 [13]. This rising mHealth market threatens changes in the way signif-
icant amounts of health data will be managed, with a paradigm shift from
mainframe systems located in the facilities of healthcare providers to apps
on mobiles and storage in shared cloud services. This trend is paralleled by
a new openness in which devices that were once only available in hospitals
become widely available to individuals outside the hospitals. Furthermore,
flexible mHealth applications tempt clinicians away from the hospital-based
systems they used in the past. This popular market will disruptively chal-
lenge traditional approaches by being cheap and accessible.
The proliferation of mHealth apps is radically changing the way healthcare
services are delivered. In mHealth, mobile devices connected to portable or
embedded medical sensors will enable long-term continuous medical or health
monitoring for many purposes [14, 15, 16, 10]: for outpatients to monitor their
chronic medical conditions, for individuals to increase physical activities and
to change their eating habits, for athletes to track their training activities
and performance, or for physicians to remotely monitor their patients’ health
conditions and to respond to emergencies in a timely manner.
3.1.2 Security and Privacy of mHealth
Despite the great potential and benefits that mHealth creates, new security
and privacy risks abound in mHealth apps [10, 17, 18]. Security and pri-
vacy of health data could be significantly affected by the mHealth trend.
Freed from the bonds of HIPAA, mHealth apps are free to handle data using
lower assurances than those typically applied to HIPAA entities. However,
the data they handle is often as sensitive as the data handled by HIPAA
entities. Typical Google Play apps such as Self-help Anxiety Management,
iCardio, Epocrates CME, and Clinical Advisor provide assurance with men-
tal health concerns, activity monitoring, and information services that reveal
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user interests in particular symptoms or diseases. To exercise enforcement
discretion on the emerging mHealth market, the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA for short) issued guidelines for mobile medical applications [19] in
September 2013, intending to apply its regulatory oversight to ”mobile medi-
cal applications”. Section III.C of the FDA guidance defines ”mobile medical
applications” as those ”to be used as accessories to regulated medical devices
or to transform into a regulated medical devices”. The FDA only regulates
a small subset of mHealth apps that connect to and act as an extension of
medical devices, and mobile apps that transform mobile platforms into reg-
ulated medical devices, such as an app that turns a mobile device into an
electrocardiography (ECG) machine. It doesn’t regulate mHealth apps in a
broader range. Based on the incompleteness of FDA regulatory scopes, it is
important to develop guidelines for the security and privacy of mHealth apps
that suit a dynamic market while assuring that the growth of mHealth does
not lead to a cavalier vendor attitude toward personal data.
3.2 Methodology
We carry out a three-stage study of the security and privacy status of free
mHealth apps offered on Google Play. In the first study we classify the top
160 free mHealth apps in Google Play and examine them to formulate a list
of six attack surfaces that need attention in mHealth apps. These are shown
in Table 3.1. We then select a random sample of 27 apps from the top 1080
apps and analyze them with respect to these six attack surfaces. We find
significant issues with three attack surfaces: Internet, Logging, and Third
Party Services. The concerns we find with Logging will be addressed to a
significant degree by the deployment of a version of Android, which is elabo-
rated in section 6.2, so we focus our attention on the other two. We develop a
random sample of additional 22 apps that involve Internet communications,
analyze these 22 apps, and find a significant number of risks to security and
privacy based on these two attack surfaces. Our primary conclusions are that
the mHealth apps in Google Play commonly send sensitive data in clear text
and store them on third party servers whose confidentiality rules may not be
as strong as they need to be for the type of data being stored.
Specifically, we want to understand the threats against Android mHealth
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Table 3.1: Description of attack surfaces
Attack Surface Description
Internet Sending sensitive information over the Internet
with insecure protocols, e.g., HTTP, misconfig-
ured HTTPS, etc.
Third Party Ser-
vices
Storing sensitive information on third party
servers
Bluetooth Sniffing or injecting sensitive information that is
collected by Bluetooth-enabled health devices
Logging Putting sensitive information into system logs
where it is not secured
SD Card Storage Storing sensitive information as unencrypted files
on SD card, publicly accessible by any other app
Exported Com-
ponents
Accessing Android app components from other
apps, which are intended to be private, but set
as exported
apps by answering the following three questions:
1. What are the potential attack surfaces for Android mHealth apps?
2. How widespread is the threat?
3. How serious is the threat?
In the first study, in order to understand what the potential attack surfaces
are, we identify a total number of 160 apps by selecting the top 80 free
apps in Health & Fitness category and another top 80 free apps in Medical
category on Google Play. To get a sense of the context of Android mHealth
apps and formulate a list of attack surfaces that need attention, we divide
the 160 apps into two groups with regard to their target users and classify
them into eight categories by their functionalities. By reviewing research
papers [20, 21] and online documents [22, 23], and analyzing the problems we
found directly in these 160 mHealth apps, we develop the following six attack
surfaces that represent the primary areas needing protections: Internet, third
party services, Bluetooth, logging, SD card storage, and exported components.
After identifying the attack surfaces in Study 1, in Study 2, we aim to
learn how widespread attack surfaces are. We choose the top 1080 free apps
from the Medical and Health & Fitness categories on Google Play, 540 from
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each. By using a random number generator without replacement, we select
27 apps as our dataset for Study 2. Of the 27 apps we have selected, we
analyze them one by one in details regarding to the six attack surfaces we
have identified in Study 1. As a result, three attack surfaces are identified
as important ones: Internet, third party storage and logging, because the
majority of the 27 apps suffer from the problems. Figure 3.1 shows how we
include and exclude apps for the app selection process in Study 2.
Figure 3.1: App selection flow graph for Study 2
For Study 3, we want to have a deeper understanding of how serious the
threat is with regarding to the most common attack surfaces we have identi-
fied in Study 2. The app selection process here is similar to that of Study 2.
We randomly select 120 apps from the top 1080 free mHealth apps on Google
Play and exclude the apps that have already been studied in Study 2 and
also exclude those are not sending sensitive information over the Internet.
Then we analyze the included 22 apps in detail to understand how serious
the threat is. Figure 3.2 shows how we include and exclude apps for the app
selection process in Study 3.
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Table 3.2: Classification of popular free mHealth apps on Google Play
Target
users
Category Functionality examples Modules
used
Number of
apps (%)
Lifestyle
manage-
ment
Count calories; track
eating habits, exercise,
sleep, period, pregnancy,
etc.
gyroscope,
accelerom-
eter, GPS,
network
96(60%)
Medical
sensor-
based
monitor-
ing
Monitor health metrics
such as: heart rate,
blood pressure, blood
glucose, insulin, choles-
terol, etc.
externally
connected
health
sensors,
network
15(9.38%)
Patients Medical
contact
Contact registered
nurses, doctors or
hospitals
network,
phone
call, email
14(8.75%)
Medication
and dis-
ease
Manage prescription
records; identify pills;
shop medication online;
look up symptoms;
manage chronic diseases
Network 27(16.88%)
PHR man-
agement
Manage and/or synchro-
nize PHR with health
services
Network 75(46.88%)
Medical
references
Look up drug, disease
and condition; anatomy
tool; medical calculator;
medical dictionary
Network 26(16.25%)
Healthcare
profes-
sionals
Medical
training
Aid medical students
studying medical theo-
ries
Network 9(5.63%)
Clinical
communi-
cation
Emergency alert; photo
sharing
GPS, net-
work
2(1.25%)
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Figure 3.2: App selection flow graph for Study 3
3.3 Study 1: What are the Potential Attack Surfaces?
To investigate the potential attack surfaces, we first try to understand the
context of Android mHealth apps. We summarize the classification of An-
droid mHealth apps by studying the 160 apps collected as described in section
3.2. In Table 3.2, we divide the top 160 free mHealth apps into two groups by
the expected user. Patient apps are the ones mainly used by the individual
whose health is being monitored. In most cases the monitoring is done by
the individual herself. Healthcare professional apps are the ones mainly used
by physicians, nurses, medical students and other healthcare professionals
mainly to support their activities, including the monitoring of patients. We
further classify the apps into 8 categories according to their functionalities.
These categories include Lifestyle management, Sensor-based health moni-
toring, Medical contact, Medication and disease management, and Personal
health record (PHR for short) management (Here we define PHR manage-
ment as patients to sync and manage health records on an online service
provider.) targeted for Patients, and Medical references, Medical training,
and Clinical communication targeted for Professionals. An mHealth app may
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be useful for both the Patients and the Professionals (e.g., a pill identifier
app can be used by a patient to organize pills or to be used by a pharmacist
to prevent errors in dispensing medications). Besides, an mHealth app may
belong to more than one category, since it may serve multiple functionali-
ties (e.g., a fitness tracking app can monitor lifestyle data as well as manage
PHR).
Most of the applications in the categories are appropriate for our study but
we exclude one app because it lack a medical or healthcare purpose, and we
exclude another app because its language is not English. Among the included
158 apps, we have 129 (81.65%) that are Patient-facing, 32 (20.25%) that are
Professional-facing, and 3 (1.90%) apps, drug identifiers, are both. All the
Patient-facing apps are from the Health & Fitness category and 41.03% of
the apps from the Medical category are Professional-facing. From Table 3.2,
we can see the majority (60%) of our selected apps belong to the Life man-
agement category. Nearly half (46.88%) of the apps manage and synchronize
user health records to online service providers. The average rating score
for the Patient-facing apps have almost 4 times more user installations than
Professional-facing apps.
We identify several attack surfaces as important when we review previ-
ous literature [20, 21] and online documents [22, 23]. By studying the 160
apps, we have a sense of what commercial mHealth apps do and whether
indeed there exist attack surfaces exposing vulnerabilities. We find real se-
curity threats against many Android mHealth apps, and identity six potential
attack surfaces as the most important: Internet, Third Party Services, Blue-
tooth, Logging, SD Card Storage, and Exported Components. Here we show
several example vulnerabilities found in Android commercial mHealth apps
and demonstrate that they can lead to realistic and serious consequences.
Example 1(Unencrypted Internet). From Table 3.2, many mHealth
apps send information and most of them send unencrypted information over
the Internet. For example, both Doctor Online [24] (patients can contact
doctors online) and Recipes by Ingredients [25] (patients can search recipes
according their illness or ingredients suitable for their disease), are not only
sending sensitive information over the Internet unencrypted but also are send-
ing user email and password in cleartext over the Internet. Figure 3.3 shows
the network traffic from Doctor Online captured by Wireshark that contains
user’s name, email and password in cleartext.
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Figure 3.3: Network traffic from Doctor Online containing sensitive
information
Example 2 (Logging vulnerability). We find many mHealth apps put
user’s sensitive information into logs. For example, CVS/pharmacy [26], a
popular app with millions of users on Google Play, put user login creden-
tials and other sensitive information in their apps’ log messages. Figure 3.4
shows the log messages with sensitive information from CVS/pharmacy. In
Case 1, CVS/pharmacy logs prescription refill details from user input, in-
cluding name, email address, store number, and Rx number. In Case 2,
CVS/pharmacy puts login credentials in a debug log message. With the lo-
gin credentials for CVS/pharmacy, anyone could view a user’s profile and
prescription history, which can potentially lead to a medical identity theft.
A malicious party can even conduct pharmacy online shopping with a user’s
credit card information stored in the CVS/pharmacy online shopping store.
Figure 3.4: Log messages from CVS/pharmacy containing sensitive
information
Note that in both cases, the sensitive information is in HTTPS URLs
using a GET request method. Developers may have a misconception that all
HTTPS requests, either using GET or POST, are sent over encrypted TCP
connections so that sensitive information can be safely put into the HTTPS
URLs. However, even if sensitive information won’t be seen during transition,
it still remains visible in places like mobile app logs, server logs, browser
history and etc. Developers should avoid putting sensitive information in
any form of logs.
Example 3 (Exported components vulnerability). We find that sev-
eral mHealth apps have security threats rooted from component exposures.
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For instance, Noom Weight Loss Coach [27], an app with more than 10 million
installations, exposes its Content Providers to external apps, which means
any app can access the exposed Content Providers without declaring any per-
mission. After searching for "content://" paths in Manifest and the source
code decompiled from Noom Weight Loss Coach apk, we get a list of content
URIs defined in the app. Figure 3.5 demonstrates using an automatic secu-
rity analysis tool called Drozer [28] to read user workout history from Content
Provider with the content URI "content://com.wsl.noom.exerciseinfo".
Figure 3.5: Access Noom Weight Loss Coach’s user workout history using
Drozer
Example 4 (SD card storage vulnerability). We discover many
sleep monitoring apps, such as SnoreClock [29] and Sleep Talk Recorder
[30], record sound when users sleep and store the sleep recordings as un-
encrypted audio files on an external storage. For example, the Sleep Talk
Recorder explicitly stores sleep-recording audio files unencrypted on SD card
as YYYY-MM-DD-HH-MM-SS.wav. A malicious app with read storage permis-
sion can read the users’ sleep recordings; with internet permission, it can
further send out the files. Another example is that Urgent Care [31] stores
system logs in an unencrypted file on SD card, which leaks out what symp-
toms the patient looked up within this app.
3.4 Study 2: How Widespread is the Threat?
The complexity of Android system has led to numerous potential attack
surfaces, which could be explored by a malicious party to gain unauthorized
access to sensitive data in mHealth apps and cause serious consequences.
Analyzing these attack surfaces help security specialists perform security
assessments as well as help mHealth users/vendors understand and manage
security risks. In Study 2, we analyze these attack surfaces with a new set
of randomly selected apps. The 27 mHealth apps in Study 2 are identified
as described in section 3.2.
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Internet. Many apps access Internet either to transfer information to
a remote server or to display ads. Information that is transferred over the
Internet to the remote server is sensitive health information and ideally all
such communication with the remote server should be encrypted. We analyze
the randomly sampled apps to study why they require the Internet access
(i.e. to transfer information or to display ads). Furthermore, we analyze
if the encrypted communication is used to transfer the information to the
remote server.
Any app can get access to the Internet using INTERNET permission. To
study if the apps are using Internet for displaying ads or transferring infor-
mation to the remote server, we study the description of the apps and check
the functionality of the apps by installing and using them on a Samsung
Galaxy SII phone. We observe that 85.2% (23/27) of all the apps have per-
missions to access the Internet. 70.4% (19/27) use the Internet permissions
to display ads, while 29.6% (8/27) of them use the Internet permissions to
communicate information over the Internet.
To study whether the communication with the remote server is encrypted,
we install and use the apps. We capture their network traffic using “Shark for
Root” app and analyze the network traffic in Wireshark to see if the traffic
is encrypted. We find that 7.4% (2/27) of the apps allow the users to use the
blog or social network associated with the app via Internet, of which only one
of the apps is using encrypted communication. 25.9% (7/27) of all the apps
transmit medical information to the remote server. 66.7% (4/6) of the apps
use encrypted communication, while 50% (3/6) of the apps use unencrypted
communication to transfer the sensitive health related information.
We further analyze if the three aforementioned apps sending unencrypted
data over the Internet are sending sensitive information. And we find that
one of the app is used to search for nearby pharmacies, doctors, etc., the
second app is used to track exercise workouts, and the third (from Spain) is
used to find and contact doctors online. The third app (Doctor Online) is
sending email, username and even password unencrypted over the Internet.
Third Party Services. Android apps use storage and hosting services
such as Amazon instead of maintaining their own infrastructure. This is an
economical as well as scalable solution for mobile app vendors. But, storing
sensitive health information on these third party services can have serious
implications and that is why HIPAA does not allow storing unencrypted
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data on third party cloud services. 22.2% (6/27) apps are sending sensitive
data over the Internet. To study if these 6 apps that are actually transferring
information to remote servers are hosted on the cloud or in-premises servers
owned by the app vendors, we analyze the IP addresses of the apps from their
communication with their respective servers. IP addresses have a publicly
available record of to whom it belongs to and we use that information to find
out from where the traffic is coming. We find surprising results: all six apps
are hosted on third party services. Three of them are hosted on Amazon and
the rest three are hosted on other hosting services. Note that these apps are
using encryption for the communication only, we are not sure if data on the
remote third party services is stored in a encrypted fashion such that the
hosting companies do not have access to the data.
Bluetooth. Many Bluetooth sensing apps use Bluetooth primarily to col-
lect data from health sensors to mobile devices. Out of the 27 apps in our
dataset, one app (3.7%) connects to a Bluetooth health device to collect extra
health information. Supporting Bluetooth devices is more common among
the 160 most popular Android mHealth apps, where 15 (9.5%) provide op-
tions to collect health data from external health sensors and all of them are
Patient-facing apps. 12 of the 15 apps declare and use both BLUETOOTH and
BLUETOOTH ADMIN permissions, so that they can use Bluetooth to connect
to and collect data from external health sensors, while the remaining three
apps collect health data via Internet or by connecting with other apps. All
the apps we find with Bluetooth connectivity are Patient-facing apps. They
collect various types of health information, including heart rate, respiration,
pulse oximetry, electrocardiogram (ECG for short), blood pressure, body
weight, body temperature, quality of sleep, exercise activities and etc. Ap-
parently, Bluetooth is a major communication technology for sensor-based
health monitoring in mHealth apps. Naveed et al. [20] present a problem of
external-device misbinding (DMB for short), under the context of Bluetooth-
enabled Android devices and health sensors. They show that a malicious
app can stealthily collect user data from an Android device and also deploy
a spoofed device that injects fake data into the original device’s app. We
find one of the 27 apps actually connects to an external health sensor and
uses a default PIN code 0000, which makes that app vulnerable to the DMB
attack. To defend against the Bluetooth-based threats on mHealth apps,
Naveed et al. [20] propose an OS-level protection, which generates secure
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binding policies between a device and its official app and enforces these rules
when establishing and unpairing Bluetooth connections.
Logging. Android logging system is designed for app developers to col-
lect and view app debug output. The logging facility allows a system-wide
logging, including application information and system events. If an app is
granted READ LOGS permission, the app is allowed to read low-level system
log messages. With the READ LOGS permission, a malicious app can monitor
system logs from mHealth apps in the background and extract sensitive in-
formation from the log messages. To discover logging vulnerability, we use
a tool called logcat from Android Debug Bridge (ADB for short) shell to
view system log messages.
In our dataset, we find 9 out of 27 apps (33.3%) include sensitive infor-
mation in app logs. Among the 9 aforementioned apps, two (22.2%) dis-
close GPS coordinates, three (33.3%) disclose Facebook friend information,
one (11.1%) discloses the direction to the dentist office that a user inquires
about. One (11.1%) discloses sensitive data that could lead to more serious
consequences, that is disclosing user sign up data, including name, location
and profession. That app also leaks the medical tests that user takes on this
app. All the disclosure of private data from this app can potentially lead to
a medical identity theft. Three (33.3%) apps leak disease and drug browsing
history in the app logs. From the study on our 27-app dataset, we find a
large number (33.3%) of mHealth apps leak sensitive information in system
logs and many of them could cause serious problems.
SD Card Storage. Each Android app gets a dedicated part of file sys-
tem where it can write its private data. However, if an app writes files to
an external storage, such as an SD card, the files are not guaranteed to be
protected. With READ EXTERNAL STORAGE or WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE per-
missions, any app can read or write files from an external storage. Note that
before API level 19, the READ EXTERNAL STORAGE permission is not enforced
and all apps still have access to read from an external storage.
In our dataset, 66.7% (18/27) of the apps declare the WRITE EXTERNAL STO-
RAGE permission, which means they write data to the external storage and
the data is universally readable by any app with the READ EXTERNAL STORAGE
permission. Then, we use an existing tool Dex2jar [32] to decompile the 27
apps’ apk (application package) files to get their Java source code. After
that, we search for "ExternalStorage" and "ExternalFiles" keywords in
24
the source code to construct all possible paths for any file to be stored on the
SD card. Then, we execute all possible operations with the studied apps and
go through these directories to check their file contents. As a result, we find
none of the apps stores sensitive information as files on the external storage.
Exported Components. An Android app developer has the rights to
specify if an app component (i.e. Activity, Service, Broadcast Receiver, or
Content Provider) is public to external apps or not. A component is declared
as exported, or public, if its declaration sets the EXPORTED flag or includes at
least one Intent Filter without any permission protection. However, setting
a private component improperly as exported enables a malicious app to send
unwanted Intents to the component, which can cause security problems [21]:
broadcast injection, activity launch, or service launch. In addition, if the
Content Provider is exported, a malicious app can read or write the exported
Content Provider without declaring any particular permission. The Content
Provider supports basic "CRUD" (create, retrieve, update and delete) func-
tions and the data in a Content Provider is addressed via a "content URI".
Knowing the "content URI" from an exported Content Provider, a malicious
app can retrieve or modify the data according to the Content Provider ’s
schema. We already showed an example of unauthorized access to an ex-
ported Content Provider to read its sensitive information in Study 1.
3.5 Study 3: How Serious is the Threat?
Study 2 reveals three vulnerabilities that are common and serious: sending
sensitive information unencrypted over the Internet, using third party ser-
vices, and logging containing private data. Since logging can be fixed by
Android version upgrade, we focus on the other two threats, which are the
Internet traffic and third party services.
As only 6 apps in Study 2 are actually sending sensitive information over
the Internet, we perform another study to understand the prevalence of the
two threats. We randomly sample another 120 apps from the 540 top Health
& Fitness apps and 540 top Medical apps (1080 in total) on Google Play.
Then we manually analyze these apps to filter those are not sending any
sensitive information over the Internet. The filtering results show that 22
apps are actually sending sensitive data over the Internet and we could an-
25
alyze their Internet traffic (some apps require subscription and we filter out
those also). We install these 22 apps and capture their traffic using the same
techniques described in Study 2. We find that 63.6% (14/22) of these apps
are sending data unencrypted over the Internet and 81.8% (18/22) of them
are using third party storage and hosting services such as Amazon’s cloud
services. One of our randomly selected apps is Fitbit app and it is using en-
cryption over the Internet, but is also using third party storage and hosting
services. The four apps that are using their own servers to store and host
their app data are big companies such as Aetna, United Healthcare, Caring
Bridge and US Dept. of Health and Human Services. If third party services
receive data in cleartext, there is no point in sending data in encrypted fash-
ion. We do not have the ground truth, but we suspect that the apps that
are doing encryption for the communication are storing data unencrypted on
the clouds.
Figure 3.6: Sensitive information distribution in the 22-app dataset for
Study 3
When used as intended, a variety of sensitive user data are collected, stored,
or transmitted by these Android mHealth apps. Figure 3.6 shows the distri-
bution of sensitive information in these 22 apps. Based on our study, these
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include at least personal profiles, health sensor data, lifestyle data, medi-
cal information browsing history, and third-party app data (e.g. Facebook
account information). Depending on the type, sensitivity, and volume of
mHealth data breaches, disclosure or tampering with these sensitive data
may lead to serious consequences, such as loss of privacy, medical identity
theft, and errors in healthcare decision-making. According to a report by
World Privacy Forum [33], thefts have used stolen medical information for
a resourceful collection of nefarious reasons. For example, a Colorado man
whose Social Security number, name and address had been stolen received a
bill for $44,000 he presumably owed to a hospital because his identity had
been used by a thief to get medical services in his name. In another case,
another identity thief in Missouri used the personal data of multiple victims
to establish false driving licenses and was able to use them to obtain pre-
scriptions in the victims’ names at a regional health center. All the above
examples prove that leakage of health information can lead to serious conse-
quences.
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CHAPTER 4
SIDE-CHANNEL THREATS AGAINST
ANDROID APPS
After understanding the widespread security threats in Android mHealth
apps in the last chapter, we ask a further question: are there any limita-
tions in Android security design that could be utilized by malicious parties to
pilfer mobile users’ private information on the phone? In this chapter, we
introduce a newly-discovered side channel that can cause information leaks
on Android, which is per-app data-usage statistics. By utilizing this side
channel, a malicious party can divulge users’ private information on Android
devices. This reveals the gap between the fundamental limitations of Android
security design and the diversity in the ways the system is utilized by de-
velopers. Section 4.1 illustrates the related work of side-channel information
leaks on general platforms and Android devices. Section 4.2 describes the
techniques we develop for learning private information from Android public
resources with zero permission. More specifically, in section 4.2.1 describes
the public resources on Android leaking out information, section 4.2.2 and
4.2.3 show how a zero-permission malicious app monitors and analyzes the
public resources. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 demonstrate that we can actually uti-
lize the public resources on Android to infer users’ identity (section 4.3) and
investment interests (section 4.4).
4.1 Related Work
Side-channel information leaks have been studied for decades and new dis-
coveries continue to be made in recent years [34, 35, 36]. Among them,
most related to our work is the work on the information leaks from procfs,
which includes using ESP/EIP data to infer keystrokes [37] and leveraging
memory usage to fingerprint visited websites [38]. However, it is less clear
whether those attacks pose a credible threat on Android, due to the high non-
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determinism of its memory allocation [38] and the challenges in keystroke
analysis [37]. In comparison, our work shows that the usage statistics under
procfs can be practically exploited to infer an Android user’s sensitive infor-
mation. The attack technique used here is related to prior work on traffic
analysis [39]. However, those approaches assume the presence of an adver-
sary who sees encrypted packets. Also, their analysis techniques cannot be
directly applied to smartphone. Our attack is based upon a different adver-
sary model, in which an app uses public resources to infer the content of
the data received by a target app on the same device. For this purpose, we
need to build different inference techniques based on the unique features of
mobile computing, particularly the rich background information (i.e., social
network) that comes with the target app.
Information leaks have been discovered on smartphone by both academia
and the hacker community [7, 8, 9]. Most of known problems are caused by
implementation errors, either in Android or within mobile apps. By compari-
son, the privacy risks come from shared resources in the presence of emerging
background information have not been extensively studied on mobile devices.
Up to our knowledge, all prior research on this subject focuses on the privacy
implications of motion sensors or microphones [40, 41, 38, 42, 43]. What has
never been done before is a systematic investigation on what can be inferred
from the public resources exposed by both Linux and Android layers.
New techniques for better protecting user privacy on Android also continue
to pop up [44, 45, 8, 46, 47, 48, 7]. Different from such research, our work
focuses on the new privacy risks emerging from the fast-evolving smartphone
apps, which could render innocuous public resources related to sensitive user
information.
4.2 Mechanism
An in-depth understanding of information leaks from Android public re-
sources is critical, as it reveals the gap between the fundamental limitations
of Android security design and the diversity in the ways the system is uti-
lized by app developers. This understanding will be invaluable for the future
development of securer mobile OSes that support the evolving utility. How-
ever, a study on the problem has never been done before. In this chapter,
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we report our first study on this crucial yet understudied direction.
Our study inspects public resources disclosed at both the Android and
its Linux layers and analyzes the impact such exposures can have on the
private information maintained by a set of popular apps, in the presence
of the rich background information they bring in. This research leads to a
series of stunning discoveries on what can actually be inferred from those
public resources by leveraging such auxiliary information. Specifically, by
monitoring the network-data usage statistics of high-profile Android apps,
such as Twitter and Yahoo! Finance (one of the most widely-used stock
apps), one can find out a smartphone user’s true identity and stocks one is
interested in, without any permission at all.
All such information leaks are found to be strongly related to the fallacies
of design assumptions instead of mere implementation bugs. Every piece of
information here is actually meant to be disclosed by Android and most of
such data has been extensively used by legitimate Android apps: for example,
hundreds of data usage monitors are already out there [49], relying on the
usage statistics to keep track of a user’s mobile data consumption.
4.2.1 Leaks from Public Resources
Android is an operating system based on Linux kernel. Its security model
is based on Linux’s kernel level protection (process separation, file system
access control). Specifically, each Android app is assigned with a unique
user ID and runs as that user. Sensitive resources are usually mapped to
special Linux groups such as inet, gps, etc. This approach, called appli-
cation sandboxing, enables the Linux kernel to separate an app from other
running apps. Within a sandbox, an app can invoke Android APIs to access
system resources. The APIs that operate on sensitive resources, including
camera, location, network, etc., are protected by permissions. An app needs
to explicitly request (using AndroidManifest.xml) from the device’s user such
permissions during its installation so as to get assigned to the Linux groups
of the resources under protection, before it can utilize such resources.
Public resources on Android. Like any operating system, Android
provides a set of shared resources that underprivileged users (apps without
any permission) can access. This is necessary for making the system easy to
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use for both app developers and end users. Following is a rough classification
of the resources available to zero-permission apps:
• Linux layer: public directories. Linux historically makes available a
large amount of resources considered harmless to normal users, to
help them coordinate their activities. A prominent example is the
process information displayed by the ps command (invoked through
Runtime.getRuntime.exec, which includes each running process’s user
ID, Process ID (PID), memory and CPU consumption and other statis-
tics. Most of such resources are provided through two virtual filesys-
tems, the proc filesystem (procfs) and the sys filesystem (sysfs). The
procfs contains public statistics about process’s use of memory, CPU,
network resources and other data. Under the sysfs directories, one can
find device/driver information, network environment data (/sys/class
/net/) and more. Android inherits such public resources from Linux
and enhances the system with new ones (e.g. /proc/uid stat). For
example, the network traffic statistics (/proc/uid stat/tcp snd and
/proc/uid stat/tcp rcv) are extensively utilized [49] to keep track of
individual apps’ mobile data consumption.
• Android layer: Android public APIs. In addition to the public resources
provided by Linux, Android further offers public APIs to enable apps
to get access to public data and interact with each other. An example
is AudioManager.requestAudioFocus, which coordinates apps’ use of
the audio resource (e.g., muting the music when a phone call comes
in).
Privacy risks. All such public resources are considered to be harmless and
their releases are part of the design which is important to the system’s normal
operations. Examples include the coordination among users through ps and
among the apps using audio resources through AudioManager.requestAudio-
Focus. However, those old design assumptions on the public resources are
becoming increasingly irrelevant in front of the fast-evolving ways to use
smartphones. We find that the following design/use gaps are swiftly widen-
ing:
• Gap between Linux design and smartphone use. Linux comes with the
legacy of its original designs for workstations and servers. Some of
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its information disclosure, which could be harmless in these station-
ary environments, could become a critical issue for mobile phones. For
example, Linux makes the MAC address of the wireless access points
(WAP) available under its procfs. This does not seem to be a big is-
sue for a workstation or even a laptop back a few years ago. For a
smartphone, however, knowledge about such information will lead to
disclosure of a phone user’s location, particularly with the recent devel-
opment that databases have been built for fingerprinting geo-locations
with WAPs’ MAC addresses (called Basic Service Set Identification, or
BSSID).
• Gap between the assumptions on Android public resources and evolving
app design, functionalities and background information. Even more
challenging is the dramatic evolution of Android apps. For example, an
app is often dedicated to a specific website. Therefore, an adversary no
longer needs to infer the website a user visits, as it can be easily found
out by looking at which app is running (through ps for example). Most
importantly, today’s apps often come with a plethora of background
information like tweets, public posts and public web services such as
Google Maps. As a result, even very thin information about the app’s
behavior (e.g. posting a message), as exposed by the public resources,
could be linked to such public knowledge to recover sensitive user data.
Information leaks. In our research, we carefully analyze the ways that
public resources are utilized by the OS and popular apps on Android, to-
gether with the public online information related to their operations. Our
study discovered a new source of information leak, which is App network-
data usage. We find that the data usage statistics disclosed by the procfs can
be used to precisely fingerprint an app’s behavior and even infer its input
data, by leveraging online resources such as tweets published by Twitter.
To demonstrate the seriousness of the information leakage from those usage
data, we develop a suite of inference techniques that can reveal a phone user’s
identity from the network-data consumption of Twitter app and the stock
she is looking at from Yahoo! Finance app. We build a zero-permission app
that stealthily collects information for these attacks.
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4.2.2 Zero-Permission Adversary
Adversary model. The adversary considered in our research runs a zero-
permission app on the victim’s smartphone. Such an app needs to operate
in a stealthy way to visually conceal its presence from the user and also
minimize its impact on a smartphone’s performance. On the other hand, the
adversary has the resources to analyze the data gathered by the app using
publicly available background information, for example, through crawling the
public information released by social networks, etc. Such activities can be
performed by ordinary Internet users.
What the adversary can do. In addition to collecting and analyzing the
information gathered from the victim’s device, a zero-permission malicious
app needs a set of capabilities to pose a credible privacy threat. Particularly,
it needs to send data across the Internet without the INTERNET permission.
Also, it should stay aware of the system’s situation, i.e., which apps are
currently running? This enables the malicious app to keep a low profile, start
data collection only when its target app is being executed. Here we show how
these capabilities can be obtained by the app without any permission.
• Networking. Leviathan’s blog describes a zero-permission technique to
smuggle out data across the Internet [9]. The idea is to let the sender
app use the URI ACTION VIEW Intent to open a browser and sneak the
payload it wants to deliver to the parameters of an HTTP GET from the
receiver website. We re-implement this technique in our research and
further make it stealthy. Leviathan’s approach does not work when
the screen is off because the browser is paused when the screen is off.
We improve this method to smuggle data right before the screen is
off or the screen is being unlocked. Specifically, our app continuously
monitors /lcd power (/sys/class/lcd/panel/lcd power on Galaxy
Nexus), an LCD status indicator released under the sysfs. Note that
this indicator can be located under other directory on other devices,
for example, sys/class/backlight/s6e8aa0 on Nexus Prime. When
the indicator becomes zero, the phone screen dims out, which allows
our app to send out data through the browser without being noticed by
the user. After the data transmission is done, our app can redirect the
browser to Google and also set the phone to its home screen to cover
this operation.
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• Situation awareness. Our zero permission app defines a list of target
applications such as social network app and stock applications and
monitors their activities. It first checks whether those packages are
installed on the victim’s system (getInstalledApplications()) and
then periodically calls ps to get a list of active apps and their PIDs.
Once a target is found to be active, our app will start a thread that
closely monitors the /proc/uid stats/[uid] and the /proc/[pid]/
of the target.
4.2.3 Usage Monitoring and Analysis
Mobile-data usage statistics. Mobile data usages of Android are made
public under /proc/uid stat/ (per app) and /sys/class/net/[interface]
/statistics/ (per interface). The former is newly introduced by Android
to keep track of individual apps. These directories can be read by any app
directly or through TrafficStats, a public API class. Of particular interest
here are two files /proc/uid stat/[uid]/tcp rcv and /proc/uid stat
/[uid]/tcp snd, which record the total number of bytes received and sent
by a specific app respectively. We find that these two statistics are actually
aggregated from TCP packet payloads: for every TCP packet received or sent
by an app, Android adds the length of its payload onto the corresponding
statistics. These statistics are extensively used for mobile data consumption
monitoring [49]. However, our research shows that their updates can also be
leveraged to fingerpint an app’s network operations, such as sending HTTP
POST or GET messages.
Stealthy and realtime monitoring. To catch the updates of those
statistics in real time, we build a data-usage monitor that continuously reads
from tcp rcv and tcp snd of a target app to record increments in their val-
ues. Such an increment is essentially the length of the payload delivered by a
single or multiple TCP packets the app receives and sends, depending on how
fast the monitor samples from those statistics. Our current implementation
has a sampling rate of 10 times per second. This is found to be sufficient
for picking up individual packets most of the time, as illustrated in Figure
4.1, in which we compare the packet payloads observed by Shark for Root
(a network traffic sniffer for 3G and WiFi), when the user is using Yahoo!
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Table 4.1: Performance overhead of the monitor tool: there the baseline is
measured by AnTuTu [1]
Total CPU GPU RAM I/O
Baseline 3776 777 1816 588 595
Monitor Tool 3554 774 1606 589 585
Overhead 5.8% 0.3% 11.6% -0.1% 1.7%
Finance, with the cumulative outbound data usage detected by our usage
monitor.
Figure 4.1: Monitor tool precision
From the figure, we can see that most of the time, our monitor can separate
different packets from each other. However, there are situations in which only
the cumulative length of multiple packets is identified (see the markers in the
figure). This requires an analysis that can tolerate such non-determinism,
which we will discuss later.
In terms of performance, our monitor has a very small memory footprint,
only 28 MB, even below that of the default Android keyboard app. When
it is running at its peak speed, it takes 7% of a core’s cycles on a Google
Nexus S phone. Since all the new phones released today are armed with
multi-core CPUs, the monitor’s operations will not have noticeable impacts
on the performance of the app running in the foreground as demonstrated
by a test described in Table 4.1 measured using AnTuTu [1] with a sampling
rate of 10Hz for network usage. The scores in Table 4.1 measured by An-
TuTu benchmark imply the performances of a mobile device when or when
not running our monitor tool. The higher the scores are, the better the per-
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formance of a mobile device are. To make this data collection stealthier, we
adopt a strategy that samples intensively only when the target app is being
executed, which is identified through ps.
Analysis methodology. The monitor cannot always produce determinis-
tic outcomes: when sampling the same packet sequence twice, it may observe
two different sequences of increments from the usage statistics. To obtain a
reliable traffic fingerprint of a target app’s activity we design a methodology
to bridge the gap between the real sequence and what the monitor sees.
Our approach first uses Shark for Root to analyze a target app’s behavior
(e.g., click on a button) oﬄine - i.e. in a controlled context - and generate
a payload-sequence signature for the behavior. Once our monitor collects a
sequence of usage increments from the app’s runtime on the victim’s Android
phone, we compare this usage sequence with the signature as follows. Con-
sider a signature (· · · , si, si+1, · · · , si+n, · · · ), where si,··· ,i+n are the payload
lengths of the TCP packets with the same direction (inbound/outbound),
and a sequence (· · · ,mj, · · · ), where mj is an increment on a usage statis-
tic (tcp rcv or tcp snd) of the direction of si, as observed by our monitor.
Suppose that all the elements before mj match the elements in the signature
(those prior to si). We say that mj also matches the signature elements if
either mj = si or mj = si + · · ·+ si+k with 1 < k ≤ n. The whole sequence is
considered to match the signature if all of its elements match the signature
elements.
The payload-sequence signature can vary across different mobile devices,
due to the difference in the User-Agent field on the HTTP packets produced
by these devices. This information can be acquired by a zero-permission app
through the android.os.Build API.
4.3 Identity Inference
A person’s identity, such as name, email address, etc., is always considered
to be highly sensitive [50, 51] and should not be released to an untrusted
party. For a smartphone user, unauthorized disclosure of her identity can
immediately reveal a lot of private information about her (e.g., disease, sex
orientation, etc.) simply from the apps on her phone. Here we show one’s
identity can be easily inferred using the shared resources and rich background
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information from Twitter.
Twitter is one of the most popular social networks with about 500 million
users worldwide. It is common for Twitter users to use their mobile phones
to tweet extensively and from diverse locations. Many Twitter users disclose
their identity information which includes their real names, cities and some-
times homepage or blog URL and even pictures. Such information can be
used to discover one’s accounts on other social networks, revealing even more
information about the victim according to prior research [52]. We also per-
form a small range survey on the identity information directly disclosed from
public Twitter accounts to help us better understand what kind of informa-
tion users disclose and at which extend. By manually analyzing randomly
selected 3908 accounts (obvious bot accounts excluded), we discover that
78.63% of them apparently have users’ first and last names there, 32.31%
set the users’ locations, 20.60% include bio descriptions and 12.71% provide
URLs. This indicates that the attack we describe below poses a realistic
threat to Android users’ identity.
The idea. In our attack, a zero-permission app monitors the mobile-data
usage count tcp snd of the Twitter 3.6.0 app when it is running. When
the user send tweets to the Twitter server, the app detects this event and
send its timestamp to the malicious server stealthily. This gives us a vector
of timestamps for the users’ tweets, which we then use to search the tweet
history through public Twitter APIs for the account whose activities are
consistent with the vector: that is, the account’s owner posts her tweets at the
moments recorded by these timestamps. Given a few of timestamps, we can
uniquely identity that user. An extension of this idea could also be applied
to other public social media and their apps, and leverage other information
as vector elements for this identity inference: for example, the malicious app
could be designed to figure out not only the timing of a blogging activity,
but also the number of characters typed into the blog through monitoring
of the CPU usage of the keyboard app, which can then be correlated to a
published post.
To make this idea work, we need to address a few technical challenges.
Particularly, searching across all 340 million tweets daily is impossible. Our
solution is using less protected, the coarse location (e.g., city) of the person
who tweets, to narrow down the search range.
Fingerprinting tweeting event. To fingerprint the tweeting event from
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the Twitter app, we use the aforementioned methodology to first analyze
the app oﬄine to generate a signature for the event. This signature is then
compared with the data usage increments our zero-permission app collects
online from the victim’s phone to identify the moment she tweets.
Specifically, during the oﬄine analysis, we observed the following TCP
payload sequence produced by the Twitter app: (420|150, 314, 580 − 720).
The first element here is the payload length of a TLS Client Hello. This
message normally has 420 bytes but can become 150 when the parameters
of a recent TLS session are reused. What follow are a 314-byte payload for
Client Key Exchange and then that of an encrypted HTTP request, either a
GET (download tweets) or a POST (tweet). The encrypted GET has a relatively
stable payload size, between 541 and 544 bytes. When the user tweets, the
encrypted POST ranges from 580 to 720 bytes, due to the tweet’s 140-character
limit. So, the length sequence can be used as a signature to determine when
a tweet is sent.
As discussed before, what we want to do here is to use the signature to
find out the timestamp when the user tweets. The problem here is that
our usage monitor running on the victim’s phone does not see those packets
and can only observe the increments in the data-usage statistics. Our oﬄine
analysis shows that the payload for Client Hello can be reliably detected
by the monitor. However, the time interval between Key-Exchange message
and POST turns out to be so short that it can easily fall through the cracks.
Therefore, we have to resort to the aforementioned analysis methodology
to compare the data-usage sequence collected by our app with the payload
signature: a tweet is considered to be sent when the increment sequence is
either (420|150, 314, 580− 720) or (420|150, 894− 1034).
Identity discovery. From the tweeting events detected, we obtain a
sequence of timestamps T = [t1, t2, · · · , tn] that describe when the phone
user tweets. This sequence is then used to find out the user’s Twitter ID
from the public index of tweets. Such an index can be accessed through the
Twitter Search API [53]: one can call the API to search the tweets from a
certain geo-location within 6 to 8 days. Each query returns 1500 most recent
tweets or those published in the prior days (1500 per day). An unauthorized
user can query 150 times every hour.
To collect relevant tweets, we need to get the phone’s geo-location, which
is specified by a triplet (latitude, longitude, radius) in the twitter search
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Table 4.2: City information and Twitter identity exploitation
Location Population City size Time inter-
val covered
(radius)
# of times-
tamps
Urbana 41,518 11.58 mi2 243 min(3 mi) 3
Bloomington 81,381 19.9 mi2 87 min (3 mi) 5
Chicago 2,707,120 234 mi2 141 sec (3 mi) 9
API. Here all we need is a coarse location (at city level) to set these pa-
rameters. Android has permissions to control the access to both coarse and
fine locations of a phone. Our zero-permission app can invoke the mobile
browser to visit a malicious website, which can then search her IP in public
IP-to-location databases [54] to find her city. This allows us to set the query
parameters using Google Maps. Note that smartphone users tend to use
Wi-Fi whenever possible to conserve their mobile data, which gives our app
chances to get their coarse locations. Please note that we do not require the
user to geo-tag each tweet. The twitter search results include the tweets in
a area as long as the user specifies her geo-location in her profile.
As discussed before, our app can only sneak out the timestamps it collects
from the Twitter app when the phone screen dims out. This could happen
minutes away from the moment a user tweets. For each timestamp ti ∈ T , we
use the twitter API to search for the set of users ui who tweet in that area in
ti±60s (due to the time skew between mobile phone and the twitter server).
The target user is in the set U = ∩ui. When U contains only one twitter ID,
the user is identified. For a small city, oftentimes 1500 tweets returned by a
query are more than enough to cover the delay including both the ti ± 60s
period and the duration between the tweet event and the moment the screen
dims out. For a bigger city with a large population of Twitter users, however,
we need to continuously query the Twitter server to dump the tweets to a
local database, so when our app report a timestamp, we can search it in the
database to find those who tweet at that moment.
Attack evaluation. We evaluate the effectiveness of this attack at three
cities, Urbana, Bloomington and Chicago. Table 4.2 describes these cities’
information.
We first study the lengths of the time intervals the 1500 tweets returned
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by a Twitter query can cover in these individual cities. To this end, we
examine the difference between the first and the last timestamps on 1500
tweets downloaded from the Twitter server through a single API call, and
present the results in Table 4.2. As we can see here, for small towns with
populations below 100 thousand, all the tweets within one hour and a half
can be retrieved through a single query, which is sufficient for our attack:
it is conceivable that the victim’s phone screen will dim out within that
period after she tweets, allowing the malicious app to send out the timestamp
through the browser. However, for Chicago, the query outcome only covers
2 minutes of tweets. Therefore, we need to continuously dump tweets from
the Twitter server to a local database to make the attack work.
In this experiment, we run a script that repeatedly calls the Twitter Search
API, at a rate of 135 queries per hour. All the results without duplicates are
stored in a local SQL database. Then, we post tweets through the Twitter
app on a smartphone, under the surveillance of the zero-permission app. Af-
ter obvious robot Twitter accounts are eliminated from the query results, our
Twitter ID are recovered by merely 3 timestamps at Urbana, 5 timestamps
at Bloomington and 9 timestamps in Champaign, which is aligned with the
city size and population (number of people).
4.4 Investment Inference
Knowing your personal investment. A person’s investment information
is private and highly sensitive. Here we demonstrate how an adversary can
infer her financial interest from the network data usage of Yahoo! Finance,
a popular finance app on Google Play with nearly one million users. We
discover that Yahoo! Finance discloses a unique network data signature
when the user is adding or clicking on a stock.
Stock search autocomplete. Similar to all aforementioned attacks, here
we consider that a zero-permission app running in the background collects
network data usage related to Yahoo! Finance and sends it to a remote
attacker when the device’s screen dims out. Searching for a stock in Yahoo!
Finance generates a unique network data signature, which can be attributed
to its network-based autocomplete feature (i.e. suggestion list) that returns
suggested stocks according to the user’s input. Consider for example the
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case when a user looks for Google’s stock (GOOG). In response to each
letter she enters, the Yahoo! Finance app continuously updates a list of
possible autocomplete options from the Internet, which is characterized by a
sequence of unique payload lengths. For example, typing ”G” in the search
box produces 281 bytes outgoing and 1361 to 2631 bytes incoming traffic.
We find that each time the user enters an additional character, the outbound
HTTP GET packet increases by one byte. In its HTTP response, a set of
stocks related to the letters the user types will be returned, whose packet size
depends on the user’s input and is unique for each character combination.
Stock news signature. From the dynamics of mobile data usage pro-
duced by the suggestion lists, we can identify a set of candidate stocks. To
narrow it down, we further study the signature when a stock code is clicked
upon. We find that when this happens, two types of HTTP GET requests will
be generated, one for a chart and the other for related news. The HTTP
response for news has more salient features, which can be used to build a
signature. Whenever a user clicks on a stock, Yahoo! Finance will refresh the
news associated with that stock, which increases the tcp rcv count. This
count is then used to compare with the payload sizes of the HTTP packets
for downloading stock news from Yahoo! so as to identify the stock chosen
by the user. Also note that since the size of the HTTP GET for the news is
stable, 352 bytes, our app can always determine when a news request is sent.
Attack evaluation. In our study, we run our zero-permission app to
monitor the Yahoo! Finance app on a Nexus S 4G smartphone. From the
data-usage statistics collected while the suggestion list is being used to add
10 random stocks onto the stock watch list, we manage to narrow down
the candidate list to 85 possible stocks that match the data-usage features
of these 10 stocks. Further analyzing the increment sequence when the user
clicks on a particular stock code, which downloads related news to the phone,
we are able to uniquely identify each of the ten stocks the user selects among
the 85 candidates.
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CHAPTER 5
MITIGATION TECHNIQUES
To address the security concerns as described in chapter 3 and 4, we proposes
mitigation techniques in this chapter. Section 5.1 discusses the strategies for
side-channel information leakage and its permission enforcement framework
on Android. Section 5.2 proposes a mitigation strategy and introduces a
static analysis framework, and also discusses compliance recommendations
for mHealth apps.
5.1 Strategies for Side-channel Information Leakage
Given the various public resources on Android, the information leaks we
found are very likely to be just a tip of the iceberg. Finding an effective
solution to this problem is especially challenging with rich background in-
formation of users or apps gratuitously available on the web. To mitigate
such threats, we first take a closer look at the attacks discovered in our re-
search. To address the availability mechanism of the data usage statistics,
which have already been used by hundreds of apps to help Android users
keep track of their mobile data consumption, merely removing them from
the list of public resources is not an option. In this section, we report our
approach on mitigating the threat deriving from the statistics availability,
while maintaining their utility.
5.1.1 Mitigation Strategies
To suppress information leaks from statistics available through tcp rcv and
tcp snd as described in Chapter 4, we can release less accurate information.
Here we analyze a few strategies designed for this purpose.
Round up and round down. One strategy is to reduce the accuracy
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of the available information by rounding up or down the actual number of
bytes sent or received by an app to a multiple of a given integer before
disclosing that value to the querying process. This approach is reminiscent
of a predominant defense strategy against traffic analysis, namely packet
padding [39, 55]. The difference between that and our approach is that we
can not only round up but also round down to a target number and also work
on accumulated payload lengths rather than the size of an individual packet.
This enables us to control the information leaks at a low cost, in terms of
impact on data utility.
Specifically, let d be the content of a data usage counter (tcp rcv or
tcp snd) and α an integer. When the counter is queried by an app, our
approach first finds a number k such that kα ≤ d ≤ (k+ 1)α and reports kα
to the app when d− kα < 0.5α and (k + 1)α otherwise.
Aggregation. A limitation of the simple rounding strategy results from
the fact that it still gives away the payload size of each packet, even though
the information is perturbed. As a result, it cannot hid packets with exceed-
ingly large payloads. To address this issue, we can accumulate the data usage
information of multiple queries, for example, stocks on Yahoo! Finance the
user looks at, and only release the cumulative result when a time interval ex-
pires. This can be done, for example, by updating an app’s data usage to the
querying app once every week, which prevents the adversary from observing
individual packets.
5.1.2 Enforcement Framework
To enforce the aforementioned policies, we design a preliminary framework,
which is elaborated below.
A naive idea would be adding yet another permission to Android’s al-
ready complex permission system and have any data monitoring app re-
questing this permission in AndroidManifest.xml. However, prior research
shows that the users do not pay too much attention to the permission list
when installing apps, and the developers tend to declare more permissions
than needed [56]. On the other hand, the traffic usage data generated by
some applications (e.g., banking applications) is exceptionally sensitive, at
a degree that the app developer might not want to divulge them even to
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the legitimate data monitoring apps. To address this problem, our solu-
tion is to let an app specify ”permissions” to Android, which defines how
its network usage statistics should be released. Such permissions, which are
essentially a security policy, was built into the Android permission system
in our research. Using this usage counters as an example, our framework
supports four policies: NO ACCESS, ROUNDING, AGGREGATION and
NO PROTECTION. These policies determine whether to release an app’s
usage data to a querying app, how to release this information and when
to do that. They are enforced at a UsageService, a policy enforcement
mechanism by holding back the answer and adding noise to it or periodically
updating this information.
5.2 Strategies for Security Concerns in mHealth Apps
We have discussed several vulnerabilities discovered in Android mHealth apps
in chapter 3 - unsecured Internet, third party storage, Bluetooth, logging, SD
card storage, and exported components. Given the variety of existing Android
mHealth apps and the number of upcoming new apps in the market, the
vulnerabilities we found and discussed in chapter 3 is just a tip of the iceberg.
Furthermore, even though applications in the markets were not designed to
be malicious and were carefully programmed, they may still surfer from data
leakage threats, for instance, when their source code contains unnecessary
system logs that disclose sensitive information. Many developers are not
able to fully understand the privacy implications, nor are they not be able
to take fully control which data flows to which dangerous channel.
5.2.1 Static Analysis
To circumvent the data leakage threats in Android mHealth apps, we need
a way to automatically assess and detect both newly discovered and existing
known threats in the market. Static taint analysis addresses this problem
by analyzing tainted data flows through Android applications and sending
outputs to human analysts or to automated tools which can make security-
decisions. This static taint analysis approach can keep track of sensitive
“tainted” information through the application by starting at any one from
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a list of pre-defined sources (e.g., an API method returning users’ contact
list or a source labeled in source code) and then following the data flow
until it reaches any one from a list of pre-defined sinks (e.g., an API method
storing the information on a SD card). It gives precise information about
which sensitive data may leak to which sink channel, as shown in figure 5.1.
Many previous research works [57, 58, 59] work on the static taint analysis,
while some work on dynamic program analysis such as TaintDroid [44]. Both
static analysis and dynamic analysis can be used for this task. But dynamic
analysis may require many test runs to reach appropriate code coverage. On
the other side, malware can be developed to be able to recognize the behavior
of dynamic analysis and pose as a benign application to bypass the detection.
For the above reasons, we choose static analysis over dynamic analysis for
data leakage detection.
Figure 5.1: Data leakage detection with static analysis
Many challenges exist for implementing static analysis on Android due
to the special design of Android operating system. Existing data-flow anal-
ysis techniques and modeling methods are not directly applicable to An-
droid applications. Difficulties are triggered because of Android program-
ming paradigm’s special multiple entry points. Unlike a Java program, an
Android app doesn’t have a single entry point. Developers can define many
entry points for a single Android app. As noted in section 2.1, there are
four types of components developers can define: Activity, Service, Content
Provider and Broadcast Receiver. The Android framework calls the meth-
ods associated with these components, to start, stop, pause, or to resume the
components, depending on the environment needs. Data flow analysis can be
expensive on Android apps because of its asynchronous execution and inter-
component data flow. To be able to effectively predict the data flow, static
analysis must not only precisely model the life-cycles of components but also
integrate callbacks for system-event handling (e.g., for camera sensor), UI
interaction and so on.
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Figure 5.2: Static analysis system design framework
From our observation, many real-world vulnerabilities we discovered in
chapter 3 have sources beyond the scope of FlowDroid’s pre-defined source
list, including account, Bluetooth, browser, calendar, contact, database, file,
network, nfc, settings, sync, and unique-identifiers. The FlowDroid’s sources
are all returned from API methods, but for sensitive information (e.g., per-
sonal information like name, age and weight, or health information) that is
from user input is hard to be categorized and captured with the tool. Neither
false positive or false negative is acceptable in this scenario, since false posi-
tive may lead to too much inaccurate warnings and false negative can make
the warnings incomplete. So we add a source builder into the architecture,
with which the sources can be collected from labels in the source code or au-
tomated detection tool based on machine-learning technique [57]. Figure 5.2
shows our proposed framework for the static taint analysis tool on Android
apps. This architecture is derived from FlowDroid [58], and we improve it
by adding source builder into the architecture. After unzipping the app’s
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app file, our tool searches through the application for lifecycle and call back
methods by parsing various Android-specific files, including manifest, Java
source code, layout xmls and so on. The source builder then constructs a list
of sources from automated source detection tool built upon machine-learning
technique [57] or from labels defined by developers in source code. Sinks are
built with automated sink detection from pre-defined sink list. Next, the
tool generates a dummy main method as a single entry point for the Android
program from the list of lifecycle and callback methods. This main method
is then used to generate a call graph for the taint analyzer. The taint ana-
lyzer reports any possible links between the sources and sinks as warnings of
potential vulnerabilities to the developers for a further check.
5.2.2 Compliance Recommendations
The increased use of mHealth in various scenarios results in greater risks
to health-related information on mobile devices. MHealth vendors including
app developers and healthcare service providers should make efforts to ensure
that mHealth apps facilitate security compliance. Based on our study on
the risks from Android mHealth apps, here are some important compliance
recommendations:
• Encryption is essential to secure personal data stored on mobile devices.
• When accessing web-based services for syncing users’ sensitive data,
TLS/SSL is necessary to be deployed throughout the Internet trans-
mission session.
• Even though the network transmission session is protected and en-
crypted, using third party services to store users’ sensitive data must
be closely reviewed and users should be informed when it is happening.
• Developer guidelines or training can be helpful in avoiding many of the
common mistakes that are rooted from development with poor secure
practices.
• Risk assessment provided by authorities can further minimize the se-
curity risks that may harm users.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
In this chapter, we summarize the findings from the study of Android mHealth
apps and the investigation on Android side channel exploits in section 6.1,
and discuss the limitations of the study for these two studies respectively in
section 6.2.
6.1 Summary of Findings
In this section, we summarize the findings from the studies in this thesis.
Study of Android mHealth apps. Our three-stage study in chapter
3 shows some serious problems with the Android mHealth apps. The ma-
jor issue is unencrypted communication over the Internet and the use of
third party services. Our study shows that a significant amount of Android
mHealth apps on Google Play suffer from these issues. We believe that these
issues need further attention from vendors, users and administration author-
ities, since these issues cannot be easily fixed. Many Android mHealth app
developers are not security experts and lack of necessary security senses. It is
not economical for the app vendors to maintain their own servers and it not
clear how encryption could be used to store data on the third-party services.
App vendors tend to use unencrypted communication and build services on
third party hosts. For Android mHealth apps, more adequate security and
privacy guarantees are in urgent demand.
Understanding and proving data leakage from public resources on
Android. In chapter 4, we make a first step to understand the fundamental
design deficiencies of Android: the Android operating system is designed
based on a set of shared resources, which could be utilized by a malicious
party to infer sensitive information. We discover an unexpected channel on
Android: per-app data-usage statistics. Our study reveal that the per-app
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data-usage statistics channel can be a threat to user privacy by showing
two attack instances - to infer a user’s identity with Twitter app and public
databases and to infer a user’s investment interests with Yahoo! Finance
app.
Mitigation strategies for the side-channel data leakage. The side-
channel threat discussed in chapter 4 can hardly be mitigated, but it is still
possible to circumvent this threat with Android version upgrades. As dis-
cussed in section 5.1, we add the Android kernel with additional permissions
control for the data-usage statistics readings, such that developers can have
the rights to define how the network usage statistics should be released for
each app. We propose round up or round down and aggregation strategies
and further discuss the enforcement framework for permissions control in
Android kernel.
Proposal of static analysis framework. As the number of Android
apps is exploding, many new security vulnerabilities emerge in the market.
It is becoming hard for us to clearly define and detect all the data leakage
threats for new channels and new data types, so we propose an automated
static analysis technique in section 5.2. We add an additional source detection
mechanism into an existing static analysis tool called FlowDroid and enable
the tool to find sources that are labeled by developers.
6.2 Limitations
In this section, we discuss the limitations of our study in this thesis.
App version upgrade. In chapter 4, we describe a discovery of a new
data leakage channel: per-app data-usage statistics and we give two instances
of private inferences: identity inference from Twitter app and investment
interest inference from Yahoo! Finance app. The success of data inferences is
highly dependent on the accuracy of data-usage statistics from pre-analysis.
If the target app has any version upgrade, the data-usage statistics may
change. It will cause our data monitoring tool to be inaccurate or even to
become unable to work. The only way to circumvent this problem is to create
a variety of signature data entries for various different versions of target apps,
so that even the version changes, we can still detect correctly the behavior
with the data-usage signature.
49
Android library behavior change. Android has been making efforts by
doing system behavior changes to circumvent newly found threats. Some of
the security issues discussed in chapter 3 can be mitigated by Android version
updates. For example, to mitigate the storage information leakage problem,
starting from Android 4.4, the WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE permission has been
modified that it only allows apps to write on an external storage within its
app-specific directory. To mitigate the logging information leakage problem,
since Jelly Bean (Android 4.1), an app can only collect and view log messages
originating from itself. However, on a rooted device (i.e., a device allows any
app to run administration permissions on Android), a malicious app can, by
executing a pm grant command, grant itself a READ LOGS permission. This
means that it is still dangerous for an app to keep sensitive information in the
system logs. According to the Android platform distribution [60] collected
in March, 2014, almost 40% of the overall Android devices are under the
version of Jelly Bean. Due to a large number of Android devices users and
mHealth apps, it is still highly lucrative for malicious to investigate ways to
harvest sensitive personal healthcare information from mHealth apps.
Side-channel information leakage mitigation strategies. To miti-
gate the side-channel information leaks from data-usage stats as described
in chapter 4, we propose data-usage stats mitigation strategies in chapter
5. The strategies are to round up, round down or aggregate statistics avail-
able through tcp rcv and tcp snd in order to suppress information leaks.
However, there are some mobile apps on Android that are operating highly
dependent on the statistics collected via these channels. For example, hun-
dreds of data usage monitors are already out there [49], relying the usage
statistics to keep track of a user’s mobile data consumption. If we suppress
the information leaks by making these statistics less accurate, it would affect
the data monitor apps’ current level of precision.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
In this master thesis, we explore the security threats in Android apps in two
different directions: studying vulnerabilities in the mHealth sector and dis-
cussing a specific side-channel attack on Android. With a three-stage study
on Android mHealth apps, we discover that many Android mHealth apps
have issues of using unsecured Internet and third party hosting services. We
present our compliance recommendations for these problems needing atten-
tion from vendors, users, and authorities. To mitigate the general data leak-
age problem in mHealth apps, we propose a static analysis framework, with
a source detection mechanism, to enable developers labeling sensitive data
that is easily to be missed by automated tools without human interaction.
Our second study on the side-channel attack discovers an unexpected in-
formation leakage channel: per-app data-usage statistics. Our study reveals
that highly sensitive user data, such as identity and investment interests, can
be inferred from public resources by a malicious app with zero permission
on Android devices. Our findings call into question the design assumptions
made by Android developers on public resources and demand new efforts to
address such privacy risks. To this end, we further propose a preliminary
design for mitigating the threats from the selected public resources, while
preserving their utility.
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